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I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the Clean Air Act was passed in 1977, the United States’
purpose regarding our nation’s air has been to keep it healthy and
safe, as well as to “protect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s air
resources so as to promote the public health and welfare and the
productive capacity of its population . . . [and] to achieve the
prevention and control of air pollution.”1 Under the Trump
administration, there was a significant trend towards deregulation
of environmental and climate initiatives and programs, and
specifically applicable to this case note, the Kigali Amendment to the
Montreal Protocol. However, while the federal government failed to
take the initiative to reduce emissions in accordance with the Paris
Agreement, various states started to rise to the challenge and act as
a cohesive unit under the United States Climate Alliance.2
This case note aims to tackle the question of whether states have
the power to regulate greenhouse gases, specifically
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) within vehicle air conditioning units in
light of precedent case law, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
guidance documents, and the newly minted EPA revocation of
California’s Clean Air Act tail-pipe emissions waiver. In Part II, I will
provide a brief background of HFCs, their environmental impacts,
1. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1)–(2).
2. See U.S. CLIMATE ALL., 2019 FACT SHEET (Apr. 2019),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5a4cfbfe18b27d4da21c9361/t/5ccb5aa56e9a7f
542fe4233c/1556830885910/USCA+Factsheet_April+2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/69PH-CFDQ].
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and their regulation under the Clean Air Act. Next, I will briefly
recount how HFCs have been regulated to date, focusing on the
procedural history involving HFCs under the Montreal Protocol, the
Significant New Alternatives Program (SNAP), the Kigali
Amendment, and the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in Mexichem v. EPA.3 Part
III includes a brief case study of California and Washington—two
states that successfully regulated HFCs at the state level—and
comments on the U.S. Climate Alliance. Then, Part IV provides an
in-depth analysis of the effect of the revocation of California’s Clean
Air Act emissions waiver in the context of HFCs in vehicle air
conditioning units. Within this analysis, I discuss dormant
commerce clause and preemption issues to determine the efficacy of
states’ future HFC regulations within vehicle air conditioning
systems. Finally, Part IV concludes that state regulation of HFCs is
likely impermissible under preemption doctrines as well as dormant
commerce clause analyses. State legislation would likely conflict
with preemption clauses under the Clean Air Act due to the indirect
effect that air conditioning has on fuel efficiency as well as its direct
conflict with labeling requirements. Similarly, state regulation of
HFCs in vehicular air conditioning systems would likely violate the
dormant commerce clause due to the impermissible
extraterritoriality reach that the effect of labeling and retrofitting
requirements would have on out-of-state interests and interstate
commerce.
II. WHAT ARE HYDROFLUOROCARBONS?
BACKGROUND, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT, AND
DEVELOPMENT
A. Development, Structure and Background of
Hydrofluorocarbons
HFCs are extremely potent greenhouse gases (GHGs), often
identified as Short-Lived Climate Pollutants (SLCPs) due to their
global warming potential (GWP) 1000 to 3000 times as strong as that
of carbon dioxide.4 Short-lived climate pollutants are chemicals that
3. Mexichem Fluor, Inc. v. EPA, 866 F.3d 451 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
4. What are Hydrofluorocarbons?, EIA, https://eiaglobal.org/campaigns/Climate/what-are-hydrofluorocarbons
[https://perma.cc/QCG6-N4CZ].
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remain in the atmosphere for a shorter period of time compared to
other pollutants such as carbon dioxide and nitrous oxide. Some
examples of SLCPs include HFCs, methane, black carbon aerosols,
and tropospheric ozone, which can last in the atmosphere anywhere
from several days (black carbon) to approximately 15 years (HFCs).5
However, when compared to the timespan of carbon dioxide and
nitrous oxide, which can subsist within the environment for
“centuries to millennia,”6 these SLCPs or “super greenhouse gases,”
while short-lived, are approximately 1,000 times more effective at
trapping heat than carbon dioxide.7 SLCPs like the ones mentioned
above have been identified to only represent approximately 1% of
global emissions; however, observations and studies have shown that
these SLCPs, and HFCs specifically, have increased within the
atmosphere at a rate of 10–15% per year8 and will likely continue to
rise, especially in developing countries.9 While HFCs are utilized in
many different industrial and commercial fashions and end-uses,10
they are exclusively studied here within the umbrella of refrigerants,
specifically HFCs used within vehicle air conditioners.11 HFCs are
useful in these particular types of end-uses because they have high
volatility, low thermal conductivity, low surface tension, and low
flammability.12 However, while many GHGs occur naturally, such as
carbon dioxide and methane, HFCs are completely anthropogenic

5. Y. Xu et al., The Role of HFCs in Mitigating 21st Century Climate Change, 13
ATMOSPHERIC CHEM. & PHYSICS 6083, 6083 (2013).
6. Id.
7. Kigali Meeting Agrees to Worldwide Phaseout of “Super Warming” HFCs, 46
ENV.
L.
REP.
INT’L
UPDATE,
no.
30,
Oct.
24,
2016,
https://elr.info/international/international-update/archive/46/30
[https://perma.cc/F9XM-W7GD]; DURWOOD ZAELKE ET AL., PRIMER ON HCFS 4 (Nov. 2015),
http://www.igsd.org/documents/HFCPrimer29Nov2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TL5P&
CLEAN
AIR
COAL.,
WGET];
Hydrofluorocarbons
(HFCs),
CLIMATE
https://ccacoalition.org/en/slcps/hydrofluorocarbons-hfc [https://perma.cc/2X7D-JUS8].
8. Guus J. M. Velders et al., Preserving Montreal Protocol Climate Benefits by
Limiting HFCs, 335 SCI. 922, 922 (2012); Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), CLIMATE &
CLEAN
AIR
COAL.,
https://ccacoalition.org/en/slcps/hydrofluorocarbons-hfc
[https://perma.cc/2X7D-JUS8].
9. See Xu et al., supra note 5, at 6086–87.
10. Wen-Tien Tsai, An Overview of Environmental Hazards and Exposure Risk
of Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), 61 CHEMOSPHERE 1539, 1541–42 (2005).
11. See discussion infra Part III.
12. Tsai, supra note 10, at 1541.
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and have only started being widely used throughout the last thirty
years.13
B. International Efforts to Regulate and Phase-Down
Hydrofluorocarbons
HFCs have only been in existence since the 1990s, due almost
exclusively to the Montreal Protocol and the subsequent regulated
phase-down of Ozone-Depleting Substances (ODSs), specifically
Chlorofluorocarbons
(CFCs)
and
Hydrochlorofluorocarbons
(HCFCs).14 These chemicals were utilized in the above-described
industrial contexts; however, they were phased out and replaced
with chlorine-free, man-made HFCs. While these replacement
chemicals do not contain the ozone-depleting properties or chemical
constituents of their predecessors (mainly chlorine), they do contain
chemicals that are extremely effective at trapping solar radiation—
specifically infrared—and absorbing heat within the lower
atmosphere, thus contributing to the overall global warming
potential.15 As such, various scientific models have estimated that, if
nothing changes and the developed world continues its “business-asusual” use, certain estimates indicate HFCs could contribute to an
approximately 27–45% increase of radiative forcing of carbon dioxide
(CO2) by 2050.16 While this may seem like an insubstantial increase,
these percentages are quite significant considering the International
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), in their Special Report on Global
Warming of 1.5 degrees Celsius, includes the reduction of SLCPs in
most mitigation pathways to effectuate warming to only 1.5
degrees.17 Thus, it is evident that HFC emissions constitute a
material contribution to climate change and its associated

13. See id. at 1541–42 (highlighting the start of industrial and commercial uses
of HFCs in early 1990).
14. See id. at 1540.
15. Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), MINN.
POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY, https://www.pca.state.mn.us/air/chlorofluorocarbonscfcs-and-hydrofluorocarbons-hfcs [https://perma.cc/S2NB-RF59].
16. Xu et al., supra note 5, at 6084; see Velders et al., supra note 8, at 922.
17. Joeri Rogelj et al., Mitigation Pathways Compatible with 1.5oC in the Context
of Sustainable Development, in GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5OC 93, 118 (Valérie MassonDelmotte
et
al.
eds.,
2018),
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/06/SR15_Full_Report_High_Re
s.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4PT-JYF4].
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environmental and health hazards.18 Some of these effects include a
significant drop in air quality, the increase of heat-related deaths due
to increase in extreme heat events, and the increase in frequency of
extreme weather events, which can damage critical infrastructure,
result in widespread death, and cause severe shortages of necessary
resources such as food, water, and shelter19
The phase-down of HFCs is clearly a global issue; however, the
only way in which a true freeze and phase-down of HFCs will occur
is if the developed countries act first and quickly. Doing so will give
developing countries a buffer to begin their freeze and phase-down.20
This method was developed through the Montreal Protocol, in which
developed countries successfully phased-out the use of CFCs by 1996,
and developing countries followed suit by 2010,21 which lends
support to the attestation that the Montreal Protocol was (and still
is) the most successful global climate initiative to-date.22 However,
in order for HFCs to be as effectively regulated and removed from
use as CFCs under the Montreal Protocol, each country must take
the initiative to actively pursue this goal, as enumerated within the
Kyoto Protocol.23
The Kyoto Protocol was an agreement between certain countries
to reduce anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, including HFCs,
by at least 5% below 1990 levels between 2008-2012, and the United
States is one of the countries included within the initial list of
countries.24 However, when it came time for the Protocol to be
ratified, the United States declared that it would not be involved.25

18. See id. at 118, 141.
19.
See
Climate
Impacts
on
Human
Health,
EPA,
https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/climate-impacts/climate-impacts-humanhealth_.html [https://perma.cc/WN3L-LK97] (Jan. 13, 2017); see Ove HoeghGuldberg et al., Impacts of 1.5oC of Global Warming on Natural and Human
Systems, in GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5OC, supra note 17, at 183–252.
20. See Heleen de Coninck, Strengthening and Implementing the Global
Response, in GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5OC, supra note 17, at 353.
21. Xu et al., supra note 5, at 6084.
22. Velders, et al., supra note 8, at 922.
23. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change art. 3, Dec. 10, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
24. Id.
25. See Letter to Members of the Senate on the Kyoto Protocol on Climate
Change, 37 WKLY. COMPILATION PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 444, 444–445 (Mar. 13,
2001), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/WCPD-2001-03-19/pdf/WCPD-2001-0319-Pg444-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/PM7L-DY7L].
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Since then, the United States has been involved with various
pieces of international emissions reductions agreements, especially
under the Obama administration, starting with the Paris
Agreement. The Paris Agreement’s purpose was to strengthen the
global response to climate change and demonstrates a consolidated
effort to hold “the increase in the global average temperature to well
below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit
the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels,
recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and
impacts of climate change.”26 While the Paris Agreement is an
incredibly important tool to address the global problem of
anthropogenic emissions and climate change, it does not specifically
address HFCs, and thus, will not be analyzed in detail. Still, the
connection between the Paris Agreement and HFCs is strong, as
demonstrated by President Obama’s statement recognizing how
simply focusing on these voluntary emissions reductions will not be
enough and that aggressive, mandatory enforcement of curbing
HFCs is necessary.27 As such, in the later stages of the Obama
Administration, and subsequent to the Paris Agreement, the United
States engaged in discussions regarding the Kigali Amendment to
the Montreal Protocol.
This particular amendment represents an aggressive
international agreement to phase-down the use of HFCs and include
them in the Montreal Protocol since they are incredibly potent
greenhouse gases (yet not ozone depleting substances).28 However,
26. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of
the Paris Agreement art. 2, U.N. Doc. FCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (Dec. 12, 2015)
[hereinafter Paris Agreement].
27. See Coral Davenport, Nations, Fighting Powerful Refrigerant That Warms
Planet,
Reach
Landmark
Deal,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
15,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/15/world/africa/kigali-deal-hfc-airconditioners.html [https://perma.cc/FB6S-4XKS]; Remarks Announcing the United
States Formal Entry into the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change Paris Agreement in Hangzhou, China, DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 556 (Sep. 3,
2016),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-201600556/pdf/DCPD201600556.pdf [https://perma.cc/SB7D-HSYN]. Even back in 2013, President Obama
and President Xi of China formally agreed to set phase-down of HFCs as an
emissions priority, and in President Obama’s address surrounding the Paris
Agreement, he reiterated that “the Paris Agreement alone won’t solve the climate
crisis. But it does establish an enduring framework that enables countries to ratchet
down their carbon emissions over time.” Id.
28. UNEP, THE KIGALI AMENDMENT TO THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL: HFC PHASEDOWN (2016), https://multimedia.3m.com/mws/media/1365924O/unep-fact-sheetkigali-amendment-to-mp.pdf [https://perma.cc/NE39-HW5L].
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while the United States was represented at the 28th Meeting of the
Parties to the Montreal Protocol in Kigali, Rwanda on October 15,
2016, the Trump administration refused to ratify the amendment.29
C. Significant New Alternatives Program and the Clean
Air Act
While there is no current movement to address HFCs in the
United States under the Kigali Amendment, prior to 2016, EPA,
under the Obama administration, had begun to develop and
implement a national regulation to phase-down hydrofluorocarbons
under authority delegated through the Clean Air Act and the
Montreal Protocol, identified as the Significant New Alternatives
Policy Program (SNAP).30 This program garnered its authority from
the Clean Air Act and the Montreal Protocol, specifically Section 612
of the Clean Air Act, which authorized the Administrator to replace
Class I and Class II substances (various CFCs and HCFCs,
respectively) with substances that reduce overall risks to human
health and the environment.31 Furthermore, this Section also
authorizes the Administrator to publish lists of safe alternatives, and
a list of substitutes that are prohibited,32 which may be determined
based off of “new information” or “changed circumstance”33 that
“may present adverse effects to human health or the environment.”34
Therefore, EPA began to phase out the use of HFCs through the
administrative rulemaking process.
One of the most highly-utilized HFCs within the vehicle air
conditioning industry is HFC-134a, which is included within the
SNAP substitutes list as “unacceptable” for vehicles with “Model
29. Editorial Board, This Treaty Is Good for the Environment. It Might Even Be
TIMES
(May
23,
2019),
Good
for
Trump,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/23/opinion/trump-kigali-agreement.html
[https://perma.cc/S8ZN-XD8Q].
30. See Protection of Stratospheric Ozone: Change of Listing Status for Certain
Substitutes Under the Significant New Alternatives Policy Program, 80 Fed. Reg.
42,870, 42,870 (July 20, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 82); see also 40 C.F.R.
§§ 82.170–82.184 (2020).
31. Clean Air Act § 612, 42 U.S.C. § 7671(k).
32. Id.
33. Protection of Stratospheric Ozone: Change of Listing Status for Certain
Substitutes Under the Significant New Alternatives Policy Program, 80 Fed. Reg. at
42,876.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 7671k(c).
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Year (MY) 2021, except [where] allowed under a narrowed use limit
. . . through MY 2025.”35 This particular man-made refrigerant is one
of the most frequently used HFCs36 and has a high GWP of
approximately 1300, over a 100-year span, and contributes the
highest level of “radiative forcing.”37 Radiative forcing (RF), as
defined by the IPCC, is the “change in net downward radiative flux
at the tropopause after allowing for stratospheric temperatures to
readjust to radiative equilibrium, while holding surface and
tropospheric temperatures and state variables . . . fixed at the
unperturbed values,” indicating that a high RF correlates to a
stronger effect on the atmosphere and, thus, a higher detriment to
climate change.38 Additionally, this chemical is manufactured and
distributed by Koura, once Mexichem Fluor, Inc.,39 a company that
specializes in fluorocarbon sales. This company brought suit against
the EPA on behalf of various refrigerant industry companies as a
result of the inability to manufacture and distribute HFC-134a
(among others) due to the SNAP regulations and rollbacks of these
particular refrigerants.
D. Discussion and Analysis of Mexichem Fluor, Inc. v.
EPA in the context of Federal/State Regulation
Mexichem Fluor, Inc. and Arkema, two industry-leaders of
fluorocarbon manufacturing and distribution both internationally
and within the United States, brought suit against the EPA in the
35. Protection of Stratospheric Ozone: Change of Listing Status for Certain
Substitutes Under the Significant New Alternatives Policy Program, 80 Fed. Reg. at
42,872; 40 CFR pt. 82, subpt G, app. B.
36. What are Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs)?, GLOB. MONITORING LAB’Y,
https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/hats/about/hfc.html [https://perma.cc/G5PF-NEW5].
37. GREENHOUSE GAS PROTOCOL, GLOBAL WARMING POTENTIAL VALUES,
https://www.ghgprotocol.org/sites/default/files/ghgp/Global-Warming-PotentialValues%20%28Feb%2016%202016%29_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZZT2-52NC].
38. Gunnar Myhre et al., Anthropogenic and Natural Radiative Forcing, in
CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 659, 665 (Thomas F. Stocker et
al.
eds.,
2013),
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/WG1AR5_Chapter08_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/982N-L9ZY].
39. Klea ® 134a (R-134a), KUORA, https://www.klea.com/air-conditioning/r134a/
[https://perma.cc/DNK5-DPAU]; Mexichem Fluor Changes Name to Koura, COOLING
POST (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.coolingpost.com/world-news/mexichem-fluorchanges-name-to-koura/ [https://perma.cc/QZ7Z-8QX2]. This company changed its
name to Koura in accordance with the parent company of Mexichem changing its
name to Orbia. Id.
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D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals challenging the 2015 SNAP rule that
effectively forced these companies to discontinue production of
HFCs, especially HFC-134a.40 Judge Kavanaugh (now Supreme
Court Justice Kavanaugh) presided over this case and ultimately
found that the EPA had overextended its authority. The Court held
that the Clean Air Act did not give the agency the authority to add
previously-deemed safe alternatives to the list of prohibited
substitutes.41 In finding this, the Court reiterated that “EPA may
only act as authorized by Congress. Here, EPA has tried to jam a
square peg (regulating non-ozone depleting substances that may
contribute to climate change) into a round hole (the existing
statutory landscape).”42 As such, the Court held that, since this
particular section of the Clean Air Act (Section 612, enacted as a
result of the Montreal Protocol) only deals with “ozone-depleting
substances” and not greenhouse gasses, there is no statutory
authority for the EPA to act on a quasi-legislative function.43
Furthermore, the Court also disposed of EPA’s argument that
the language of the statute, specifically the word “replace,” indicates
that every time a manufacturer uses a substitute instead of CFCs,
they are “replacing” it over and over again.44 Here, the Court looked
to the plain meaning of “replace” in order to effectively dispose of this
argument and, in analyzing EPA’s interpretation under Chevron,
determined that “EPA’s strained reading of the term . . . contravenes
the statute and thus fails at Chevron step 1.”45 While this holding
effectively vacates the 2015 SNAP Rule, in that manufacturers are
not required to replace HFCs with a substitute chemical, the court
did specify that its holding does not apply to manufacturers who are
still currently manufacturing or utilizing CFCs.46 In that instance,
they are restricted from substituting CFCs with HFCs and must use
a substitute within the updated and approved list of substitutes.47
In the wake of the Mexichem v. EPA decision, the SNAP 2015
Rule was effectively vacated. As a result of this vacatur, EPA
developed a guidance document to advise industry and interested
40. Mexichem Fluor, Inc. v. EPA, 866 F.3d 451, 460 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
41. Id. at 460–61.
42. Id. at 460.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 458–59.
45. Id.
46. See id. at 457, 459–60, 462.
47. See id. at 457.
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parties on the outcome of this case and to clarify the uncertainty
regarding the regulated field in the aftermath.48 In doing so, EPA
provided clarification regarding the court’s differentiation between
“product manufacturers” and “other users,” specifying that since the
2015 Rule does not specify or distinguish between “manufacturer,”
generally, that the court’s vacatur will apply to “any regulated
parties” in order to dispel confusion between specific case-by-case
scenarios in the interim.49 Additionally, the EPA provides examples
of potential future steps that the agency may take to address the
court’s vacatur, including potential regulations and the phase down
of HFCs in general.50 EPA discusses the premise of rolling out a
notice and comment period within the proposed rulemaking and
noted a few specific issues that may be addressed, which include
specific definitions within the Code of Federal Regulations of
“substitute” and “use,” whether the EPA should actually distinguish
between product manufacturers and general users regulated by the
rule (as the court specified), whether the regulation applies to a
specific facility’s use of a particular chemical or if the chemical in and
of itself is restricted, and whether HFCs can be regulated under
other types of legislation within the United States, such as the Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA), or through other Clean Air Act
programs, such as under National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS) or the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD)
program.51
As of the date of the publication of this Note, EPA has not
addressed the remand with a notice and comment rulemaking, and
an additional docket has not been established in order to do so.52 As
a result of this vacatur as well as the fact that EPA has been
stagnant on the notice-and-comment rulemaking and the Trump
administration did not ratify the Kigali amendment, various states
48. Protection of Stratospheric Ozone: Notification of Guidance and a
Stakeholder Meeting Concerning the Significant New Alternatives Policy (SNAP)
Program, 83 Fed. Reg. 18,431, 18,432 (Apr. 27, 2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
42).
49. Id. at 18,433–34 (specifies that since the court vacated and remanded back
to the EPA in order to promulgate a refined rule in accordance with the holding, that
the guidance is only applicable as a short-term clarification, until a proper notice and
comment period is conducted).
50. Id. at 18,435–36.
51. Id.
52. See SNAP Regulations, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/snap/snap-regulations
[https://perma.cc/C7GS-ML5N] (Dec. 11, 2020).

11

434

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

have started to take matters into their own hands and regulate
HFCs at a local-level.
III. BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THE U.S. CLIMATE
ALLIANCE AND STATE-LEVEL REGULATION OF
HFCS
A. The U.S. Climate Alliance—Brief Introduction and
Analysis
The U.S. Climate Alliance is a group of approximately 24 states
within the United States that are like-minded in the sense that they
all are individually striving to achieve emissions reductions
consistent with the Paris Agreement.53 U.S. Climate Alliance states,
including New York and California—two states historically on the
forefront of energy and climate initiatives—have joined together to
attempt to create cohesiveness throughout the U.S. in regulation and
phase-down of hydrofluorocarbons.54 Furthermore, between 2005
and 2016, U.S. Climate Alliance states have enjoyed economic
benefits and experienced an average of 14% reduction in emissions,
compared to the national average of 11%.55
In regulating HFCs, the U.S. Climate Alliance has issued a
guidance document titled, “From SLCP Challenge to Action,” which
effectively lays the groundwork for U.S. Climate Alliance states to
implement short-lived climate pollutant (including HFCs)
legislation, regulations, and guidance documents in order to continue
with the overarching goal of reducing current SLCP levels by 40–
50% by 2030.56 The framework lays out many ways in which to
implement HFC regulation at the state-level, which includes
adopting the SNAP regulations, providing incentives to the phasedown of HFCs, and supporting the ratification of the Kigali

53. U.S. CLIMATE ALL., supra note 2.
54. See id.
55. Id.
56. U.S. CLIMATE ALL., FROM SLCP CHALLENGE TO ACTION: A ROADMAP FOR
REDUCING SHORT-LIVED CLIMATE POLLUTANTS TO MEET THE GOALS OF THE PARIS
AGREEMENT
2
(Sept.
2018),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5a4cfbfe18b27d4da21c9361/t/5b9a9cc1758d4
66394325454/1536859334343/USCA+SLCP+Roadmap_final+Sept2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NV8C-5H9X] [hereinafter SLCP Challenge]. The 40–50% goal will
only take into consideration the U.S. Climate Alliance states. Id.
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Amendment to the Montreal Protocol.57 However, while the
guidance document states that some of these options can be
completed because the Clean Air Act explicitly allows states to “set
more stringent regulations than the federal government,”58 this may
be in question after the revocation of California’s Clean Air Act
waiver under the Trump Administration, as it is unclear whether
federal law preempts or otherwise constrains state authority to
regulate HFCs in this manner.59 While this revocation must be taken
into consideration, multiple U.S. Climate Alliance states have
already implemented, or intend to implement, versions of their own
state-level regulations of HFCs.60
B. State-Regulation of Hydrofluorocarbons—California
California’s legislature passed Senate Bill 1013, which
effectively added Section 39734 to the California Health and Safety
Code as well as Division 45 to the Public Resources Code, which
relates to Greenhouse Gases.61 This bill was signed into law on
September 13, 2018, and in doing so, California prohibited
fluorinated chemicals while establishing a Fluorinated Gases
Emissions Reduction Program, which aims to “promote the adoption
of new refrigerant technologies to achieve short- and long-term
climate benefits, energy efficiency, and other cobenefits, as
specified,” while including the implementation of an incentive
program,62 which is also suggested in the U.S. Climate Alliance
Framework document.63 Additionally, this particular piece of
legislation focuses on the restriction of HFCs specifically used in
refrigeration and foam end-uses; however, it does not specify

57. Id. at 20.
58. Id.
59. See Juan Carlos Rodriguez, Trump Admin. Strips Calif. of Auto Emissions
Authority, LAW360 (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1200644
[https://perma.cc/J97H-K4JM]. See also discussion infra Part IV.
60. U.S. CLIMATE ALL., supra note 56, at 20. While only California and
Washington are discussed within this note, there are multiple other states within
the U.S. Climate Alliance that are currently working to implement their own
regulations, legislation, or guidance documents, Id., but were not included in the
interest of brevity.
61. S. 1013, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
62. Id.
63. U.S. CLIMATE ALL., supra note 56, at 20.
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whether the refrigeration encompasses air conditioning within units
and/or within vehicles.64
As such, this will be analyzed in the context of California’s newly
revoked emissions waiver under the Clean Air Act, and whether
vehicular refrigerants within mobile air conditioners can be
regulated at the state-level, taking into consideration preemption
and dormant commerce clause issues. Part IV will address this in
further detail, and provide the analysis dictated above, while Part V
will discuss the next steps that state-governments can take with
California’s Clean Air Act emissions waiver revoked.
C. State-Regulation of Hydrofluorocarbons—Washington
Washington’s bill, on the other hand, is identified as Engrossed
Second Substitute House Bill 1112.65 This bill was proposed by
Washington’s House of Representatives on March 1, 2019, passed by
the state’s Senate on April 22, 2019, and finally became effective on
July 28, 2019.66 Similar to California’s bill, Washington took the
initiative to address HFCs at the state level instead of waiting for
Congress to clarify the scope of EPA’s authority to regulate HFCs.
Therefore, the main thrust of Washington’s HFC bill focuses on the
“transition to the use of less damaging hydrofluorocarbons or
suitable substitutes . . . in a manner similar to the regulations that
were adopted by the environmental protection agency.”67 The
regulations referred to within Washington’s bill are the SNAP
regulations and program that were effectively vacated by the U.S.
Supreme Court case of Mexichem Fluor, Inc., v. EPA.68
Similar to California’s legislation, Washington focuses on enduses that do not include new light duty vehicles, including
propellants, polyurethane applications and spray foams,
supermarket systems, residential consumer refrigeration products,
and centrifugal chillers, among other examples.69 However, unlike
California, Washington does include within its regulations a
64. See Cal. S. 1013.
65. H.R. 1112, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Protection of Stratospheric Ozone: Change of Listing Status for Certain
Substitutes Under the Significant New Alternatives Policy Program, 80 Fed. Reg.
42,870, 42,870 (Jul. 20, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 82).
69. Wash. H.R. 1112.
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provision that explicitly refers to “new light duty vehicles,” and
reads, “[w]ithin twelve months of another state’s enactment or
adoption of restrictions on substitutes applicable to new light duty
vehicles, the department may adopt restrictions applicable to the
sale, lease, rental, or other introduction into commerce by a
manufacturer of new light duty vehicles consistent with the
restrictions identified in appendix B, Subpart G of [the SNAP
regulations].”70 In theory, while this is particularly exciting because
it allows Washington to adopt the regulatory scheme of SNAP
through another state’s legislation, it is also concerning, at this point
in time, due to the revocation of California’s emission waivers.
Prior to the emission revocation, the more important legal issue
to understand and analyze regarding the efficacy of regulation of
HFCs in vehicle air conditioners was the Dormant Commerce
Clause, due to the inherent nature of motor vehicles being able to
cross state lines. Now, states have to contend with preemption issues
since EPA has explicitly reserved GHG vehicle emissions to
themselves, removing the carve-out of more stringent standards that
California has capitalized on for decades.71
EPA’s waiver revocation aside, another interesting facet of the
bill is the requirement of manufacturers to “disclose the substitutes
used in its products or equipment.”72 Furthermore, the bill continues
to explain what particular form the disclosure must take, specifying
that the disclosure must be, “[a] label on the equipment or product.
The label must meet requirements designated by the department by
rule. To the extent feasible, the department must recognize existing
labeling that provides sufficient disclosure of the use of substitutes
in the product or equipment.”73 This language is also significant from
a legal analysis standpoint because, not taking into consideration the
added dimension that the California emissions waiver revocation
instills, labeling in and of itself can invoke both preemption and
dormant commerce clause analyses as well as extraterritoriality
issues. That is, the legislation may have “the ‘practical effect’ of

70. Id.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1).
72. Wash. H.R. 1112.
73. Id.
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regulating commerce occurring wholly outside that State’s borders”
and thus be in violation of the Commerce Clause.74
Lastly, the Washington bill includes guidelines for monetary
reparations when violations occur.75 Again, as explained above in the
analysis of California’s HFC legislation, other states in conjunction
with the U.S. Climate Alliance have also made impressive strides to
utilize state power in regulating HFCs. However, as of the date of
this Note, there are no states within the U.S. Climate Alliance that
have included the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from
vehicles, light duty or otherwise, in their legislation.76 As such,
regulation of HFCs within vehicles will be analyzed in detail in the
next section, followed by a discussion of California’s emissions waiver
and subsequent revocation.
IV. EPA REVOCATION OF CALIFORNIA’S CLEAN
AIR ACT EMISSIONS WAIVER AND ITS EFFECT
ON STATE-LEVEL HFC REGULATION IN
VEHICLES
A. California Emissions Waiver—History and
Background in the Context of the Clean Air Act
Since the early 1940s, California has been forced to deal with
severe air quality issues as a result of surges in population, an
explosion of vehicular usage, a niche weather scheme, and unique
geography. These factors combined dangerously in 1943, when
visibility was barely three blocks in downtown Los Angeles.77 This
eventually led to the formation of various air quality committees,
boards, and scientific initiatives to determine the root cause of the
California “smog.”78 The cause of the problem was determined
initially to be Nitrogen oxides (NOx), produced by the rapidly
74. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 332 (1989); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See
infra Part IV and accompanying text.
75. Wash. H.R. 1112.
76. See, e.g., S. 1013, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018); Wash. H.R. 1112; Assemb.
5583, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2020) (clarifying that if another state enacts
restrictions applicable to new light duty vehicles, then New Jersey can adopt these
restrictions).
77. History, CAL. AIR RES. BD., https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/about/history
[https://perma.cc/7PWW-RW7K].
78. Id.
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increasing vehicular internal combustion processes.79 However, as
the science developed, many other types of noxious chemicals were
identified within the emissions from vehicle tail pipes, and, due to
the factors described above, California had to respond.
Therefore, in 1967, prior to the enactment of the federal Clean
Air Act, the California Air Resources Board (CARB) was established
to address smog and air pollution at a local level.80 Also in 1967, the
Federal Air Quality Act was passed.81 This Act included a waiver
provision that allowed California to enact and enforce emission
standards for new motor vehicles that are at least as protective, in
the aggregate, as federal government standards.82 This carve-out
was only included for California because of their unique situation in
regards to smog and heavy air pollution, and due to the fact that
prior to the enactment of the Federal Air Quality Act of 1967, CARB
had already initiated its own state-level emissions guidelines.83 This
policy waiver has carried through from the Federal Air Quality Act
of 1967 to the Clean Air Act, originally codified in 1969, and up until
the present day version of the Clean Air Act.84
Furthermore, almost as important as the carve-out for
California’s emission regulations is Section 177 of the Clean Air Act,
which gives other states the authority to adopt California’s emissions
guidelines and restrictions as long as they are more stringent than
the federal government’s guidelines.85 This is an extremely
important provision to the Clean Air Act and the nation’s emissions
as a whole because approximately fourteen states, including
California, have adopted the more stringent emissions guidelines
that CARB has set, which, prior to the waiver revocation, also
includes restricting and dialing back greenhouse gas emissions from
vehicular tail pipes.86
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-249R, CLEAN AIR ACT: HISTORICAL
INFORMATION ON EPA’S PROCESS FOR REVIEWING CALIFORNIA WAIVER REQUESTS AND
MAKING WAIVER DETERMINATIONS 1 (2009).
83. Id.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 7507.
86. CAL. AIR RES. BD., STATES THAT HAVE ADOPTED CALIFORNIA’S VEHICLE
STANDARDS UNDER SECTION 177 OF THE FEDERAL CLEAN AIR ACT (Aug. 2019),
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Additionally, throughout all of these years, EPA and the federal
government have never attempted to revoke California’s emissions
waiver. A waiver preemption request was only denied once, in 2005,
when California initially attempted to include greenhouse gas
emitting chemicals within the fuel pipe emissions under the
waiver.87 The EPA administrator, under Section 209(b), must not
issue a waiver if it is found that: “(1) the state’s protectiveness
determination was arbitrary and capricious, (2) the state’s standards
are not needed to meet ‘compelling and extraordinary conditions,’ or
(3) the state’s standards are inconsistent with certain Clean Air Act
provisions related to technical feasibility and lead time to
manufacturers.”88 In a decision published to the Federal Register in
2008, the EPA initially denied California’s waiver; 89 however, upon
reconsideration, they reversed after opening up an additional public
comment period90 and re-evaluating the greenhouse gas emissions
portion of the waiver against the backdrop of Massachusetts v.
EPA.91 Nevertheless, EPA published a final rule in September 2019
revoking California’s authority to receive emissions waivers under
the Clean Air Act for the foreseeable future.92 This is uncharted
territory and has never been done or contemplated before.

https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2019-03/177-states.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RSP8-UVNR]. See California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control
Standards; Notice of Decision Granting a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption, 78
Fed. Reg. 2112 (Jan. 9, 2013).
87. California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Within theScope Determination for Amendments to California’s Motor Vehicle Greenhouse Gas
Regulations; Notice of Decision, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,693, 34,693 (June 14, 2011).
88. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 82, at 1.
89. California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Notice of
Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption, 73 Fed. Reg. 12,156 (Mar.
6, 2008).
90. California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Within theScope Determination for Amendments to California’s Motor Vehicle Greenhouse Gas
Regulations; Notice of Decision, 76 Fed. Reg. at 34,693.
91. California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Notice of
Decision Granting a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,744,
32,745, 32, 766 (July 8, 2009) (denial reversed, taking into consideration decision in
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)).
92. The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule Part One: One
National Program, 84 Fed. Reg. 51,310, 51,310 (Sept. 27, 2019) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 85, 86 and 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533).
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B. EPA’s Revocation of California’s Clean Air Act
Emissions Waiver
On September 19, 2019, EPA Administrator Andrew Wheeler
and the acting Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA), James C. Owens, promulgated the “The
Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule Part One: One
National Program (“One National Program Rule”).” The Final Rule
primarily serves two functions: 1) to revoke California’s emissions
waiver under Section 209 of the Clean Air Act; and 2) to finalize
NHTSA’s amended new greenhouse gas emissions standards and
Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards for nationwide
and nationally-applicable fuel economy standards.93 This effectively
preempts state programs already in place that previously followed
California’s more stringent GHG tailpipe emissions standards and
ZEV mandates.94 In revoking California’s waiver, EPA and NHTSA
continued the Trump Administration’s trend of strategic regulatory
roll-backs of Obama administration climate change mitigation and
environmental administrative programs and initiatives.95
While not the issue at hand in this particular case study, it is
interesting to note that this particular revocation of California’s
waiver is currently in the preliminary stages of a hotly contested
lawsuit, which will likely be litigated for the foreseeable future.96
The State of California and approximately twenty-two states and
four cities brought suit against the EPA, DOT, and NHTSA (and
their respective Administrator’s/Secretaries) in the U.S. District
Court of the District of Columbia, seeking judicial review of the Final
Rule.97 The Final Rule itself explains the basis for the authority of
the EPA to revoke California’s waiver; essentially, it boils down to
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See Maegan Vazquez, Trump’s Dismantling of Environmental Regulations
Unwinds 50 Years of Protections, CNN POLITICS (Jan. 25, 2020),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/25/politics/trump-environmental-rollbackslist/index.html [https://perma.cc/4RRC-RARF]; see also Tracking Deregulation in the
Trump
Era,
BROOKINGS
(Sept.
9,
2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/interactives/tracking-deregulation-in-the-trump-era/
[https://perma.cc/5BNS-MX6B].
96. Juan Carlos Rodriguez, Calif., Allies Sue EPA Over Clean Air Act Waiver
Rescission, LAW360 (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1220493/califallies-sue-epa-over-clean-air-act-waiver-rescission [https://perma.cc/F6C9-ZEW8].
97. Id.
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the EPA’s interpretation that California does not have the requisite
“compelling and extraordinary conditions” for the waiver in relation
to the GHG emissions, due in part to Administrator Wheeler’s
distinction between the “uniquely-bad” local issues of smog and the
global and world-wide problem of greenhouse gasses contributing to
climate change.98 This Final Rule justifies the above distinction by
finding that, “even if California does have compelling and
extraordinary conditions in the context of global climate change,
California does not ‘need’ these standards [under CAA section
209(b)(1)(B)] because they will not meaningfully address global air
pollution problems of the sort associated with GHG emissions.”99
This then brings us back to state-level regulations and what
power the states still retain after this Final Rule was promulgated.
In the next couple of sections, this Note analyzes whether, and to
what extent, states can regulate HFCs within vehicles, taking into
consideration preemption, dormant commerce clause, and
extraterritoriality issues. Following these analyses, I will provide a
framework and examples of federal and state actors who are pushing
the envelope on regulating HFCs and SLCPs and what the future
may hold in regard to this highly contentious and relevant issue.
C. State-Level Regulation of HFCs within Vehicle
Refrigerants—Preemption Issues
The idea of preemption can be traced back to our founding
fathers and Article VI of the United States Constitution, which
states, “This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.”100 Over the years, this single line has been
repeatedly litigated. As such, the case law is applicable to many
different cases and fact patterns. In the context of state-level
regulation of HFCs, and analyzing preemption in this context, there
are three separate types of preemption that must be discussed:

98. Rodriguez, supra note 59.
99. The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule Part One, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 51,347.
100. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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express preemption, conflict preemption, and field preemption.101
Express preemption occurs when Congress (or the regulating
agency) includes a specific provision within the statute or regulation
that “expressly” details the bounds of the preemption and how it
applies to state statutes and regulations.102 Express preemption
provisions typically employ different types of commonly-used
language that will tip off the reader that an express preemption
clause may exist, such as “related to,”103 “covered,”104 “in addition to,
or different than,”105 and, “requirements, “laws,” “regulations,” and
“standards.”106
In addition to express preemption, preemption provisions can be
read into statutes and regulations, referred to as “implied” examples
of preemption. The Supreme Court has recognized two different
types of implied preemption: conflict preemption and field
101. Hillsborough Cnty. Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs, Inc. 471 U.S. 707, 713
(1985); Bedoya v. Am. Eagle Express, 914 F.3d 812, 817 (3d Cir. 2019); Thomas O.
McGarity, Trumping State Regulators and Juries, AM. PROSPECT (Apr. 14, 2017),
https://prospect.org/power/trumping-state-regulators-juries/
[https://perma.cc/MKB9-WQCP].
102. Altria Grp., Inc., v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76–77 (2008); see JAY B. SYKES &
NICOLE VANATKO, FEDERAL PREEMPTION: A LEGAL PRIMER 2 (2019) (explaining that
express preemption occurs when a “federal statute or regulation contains explicit
preemptive language”).
103. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (statute’s preemption clause mandating that
ERISA’s laws preempt all state laws that “relate to” regulated employee benefit
plans”); 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (Airline Deregulation Act prohibiting states from
enacting laws “relating to a price, route, or service of an air carrier”).
104. E.g., CSX Transp. Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664–65 (1993) (allowing
states to enact laws related to railroad safety under the Federal Railroad Safety Act
until expressly preempted by federal regulations “covering the subject matter” of
such laws).
105. E.g., 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (A State “shall not impose or continue in effect any
requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required
under this subchapter.”); id. § 467e (“Marking, labeling, packaging, or ingredient
requirements . . . in addition to, or different than, those made under this subchapter
may not be imposed by any State . . . .”); 21 U.S.C. § 1052(b) (“Requirements within
the scope of this chapter with respect to premises, facilities, and operations of any
official plant which are in addition to or different than those made under this chapter
may not be imposed by any State . . . .”).
106. E.g., 46 U.S.C. § 4306 (“[A] state . . . may not establish, continue in effect,
or enforce a law or regulation establishing a recreational vessel or associated
equipment performance or other safety standard or imposing a requirement for
associated equipment . . . that is not identical to a regulation prescribed under . . .
this title.”); 49 U.S.C. § 30103(b)(1) (“When a motor vehicle standard is in effect under
this subchapter, a State . . . may prescribe or continue in effect a standard applicable
to the same aspect of performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only
if the standard is identical to the standard prescribed under this subchapter.”).
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preemption.107 Conflict preemption occurs in situations where a
federal statute or regulation and a corresponding state-level statute
or regulation cannot be implemented or effectively followed without
contradicting or conflicting with each other.108 Field preemption
exists in situations where “state law occupies a ‘field reserved for
federal regulation,’ leaving no room for state regulation,”109 such as
federal immigration law.110 Additionally, in order for preemption to
apply in the first place, a preemption analysis must first address the
“presumption against preemption,”111 which requires that, “if
confronted with two plausible interpretations of a statute, we ‘have
a duty to accept the reading that disfavors pre-emption.’”112
However, this analysis has been challenged in various Supreme
Court cases recently, and, as such, the law is not as clear as to when
this presumption applies, especially in the context of “fields
traditionally regulated by the federal government.”113 In the context
of the regulation of greenhouse gasses, and specifically for this
particular analysis of HFCs, I will focus more on the substantive
issues relating to the express and implied preemption prongs. Local,
state, and federal government have all historically regulated
environmental and energy-related issues, and it is uncertain

107. E.g., Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992); Rice
v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (holding that federal law
preempts state law where Congress has manifested an intention that the federal
government occupy an entire field of regulation); Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S.
387, 401–02 (2012) (holding federal immigration law preempts field of alien
registration).
108. Gade, 505 U.S. at 108; Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,
142–43 (1963) (finding implied conflict preemption where it is impossible for
regulated parties to comply with both state and federal laws); Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (finding federal law impliedly preempts state laws that pose
an obstacle to full purpose and objectives of Congress); Holk v. Snapple Beverage
Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 339 (3d Cir. 2009).
109. Holk, 575 F.3d at 336 (quoting United states v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 111
(2000)).
110. Arizona, 567 U.S. at 402.
111. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230 (“[W]e start with the assumption that the historic
police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that
was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress”); Holk, 575 F.3d at 339.
112. Holk, 575 F.3d at 334.
113. See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000); Wyeth v. Levine,
555 U.S. 555, 581 (2009).
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whether and in what form the aforementioned presumption might
apply.114
Since California began regulating its emissions prior to the
passage of the Clean Air Act, preemption questions began to arise.
In regulating HFCs under the carve-out emissions’ waiver of the
Clean Air Act, the express preemption provision states that “[n]o
State or any political subdivision thereof shall adopt or attempt to
enforce any standard relating to the control of emissions from new
motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines subject to this part.”115
This is an express preemption and specifically designated as an
example of a “related to” provision. While this is a pretty clear
example of the federal agency’s purpose and intent to regulate this
field and, thus preempt state actors from setting standards for
vehicle emissions, some may argue that the regulation of air
conditioning units in vehicles (and thus HFCs in vehicles) would not
be preempted because it does not directly involve the emissions from
motor vehicles.
The abovementioned express preemption provision most clearly
applies to emissions from the tailpipes of vehicles, and the particular
GHGs emitted from said tailpipes. Air conditioning chemicals are a
completely separate entity from the chemicals most associated with
tailpipes, such as those burned off and emitted through the use of
petroleum and oil, and thus HFCs would not likely directly involve
emissions from motor vehicles. However, a counter argument to this
point is that the regulation of GHGs within air conditioning units in
vehicles indirectly influence and involve the emissions from tailpipes
because the fuel efficiency of cars can be directly related to the energy
load that air conditioners place on the car itself. Therefore,
regulating and/or changing the type of refrigerant or type of system
utilized within the vehicles can influence the emissions of chemicals
from the tailpipe. As such, even though HFCs would not likely be
included under the “tailpipe emitters” category, the regulation of
HFCs still will likely be “related to” the control of emissions from
tailpipes, thus preempting state regulatory agencies from setting
standards.
114. See generally State and Local Regulation of Climate Change, REGUL. REV.
(Feb. 19, 2018), https://www.theregreview.org/2018/02/19/state-local-regulationclimate-change/ [https://perma.cc/8F5H-JJBF]; Federal Action on Climate, CTR. FOR
CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLS., https://www.c2es.org/content/federal-action-on-climate/
[https://perma.cc/7MVG-CV33].
115. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a).
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However, as set out in Part IV(B), California’s emissions
preemption waiver allows the state to apply to the Administrator of
the agency enforcing the Act (here, EPA) for waiver of the
preemption provision as long as the state standards set are “at least
as protective of public health and welfare as applicable Federal
standards,” which is determined by the state itself (here, the state of
California and CARB).116 Therefore, California is expressly allowed
to regulate vehicle emissions at a standard more stringent than the
federal government’s, and other states around the country can then
adopt California’s standards, fourteen of which are currently doing
so.117
However, now that EPA has revoked California’s emissions
preemption waiver, the question becomes whether all of the
programs, regulations, initiatives, and state statutes that California
has implemented (and thirteen other states have adopted and
implemented) are thus preempted by the new federal emissions
standards as defined in CAFE and administered by NHTSA.118 This
analysis strictly focuses on the regulation of HFCs within vehicles
and, currently, no state has implemented vehicular language into its
HFC and GHG emissions regulations or statutes based on
California’s emissions waiver.119 Accordingly, the waiver is not as
applicable to this analysis. Still, this is a pressing matter, and
whether EPA has the authority to revoke California’s waiver will
likely be resolved in litigation. Keeping this in mind, the first
analysis that follows is conducted under the assumption that a court
will reverse the waiver revocation, followed by an analysis that the
waiver will stand.
First, if the revocation waiver of California’s emissions
exemption stands, it is likely that any forthcoming HFC statestandards that attempt to regulate vehicle air conditioners will be
116. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b); About, CAL. AIR RES. BD., https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/about
[https://perma.cc/VJE2-YYBF].
117. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
118. See 49 U.S.C. § 32919(a) (EPCA preemption language regarding fuel
economy standards); see also William C. Schillaci, EPA’s Repeal of California Waiver
Sets Up Legal Contest, EHS DAILY ADVISOR (Sept. 24, 2019),
https://ehsdailyadvisor.blr.com/2019/09/epas-repeal-of-california-waiver-sets-uplegal-contest/ [https://perma.cc/3HFU-TGHP].
119. See U.S. CLIMATE ALL., supra note 2 (noting the absence of language
relating to regulation of vehicular end uses among list of Climate Alliance states with
HFC regulations).
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preempted by either Section 209 of the Clean Air Act120 or the fuel
economy standards preemption section of the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act of 1975 (EPCA).121 As enumerated above, Section
209 of the Clean Air Act would likely apply through conflict
preemption because, even though not emitted through vehicle
tailpipes when the air conditioners they are utilized in are leaky or
otherwise failing, HFCs are still indirectly “related to” the emissions
of GHGs through vehicle tailpipes due to the effect that refrigerants
and air conditioning systems have on fuel efficiency and thus tailpipe
emissions.
As for the fuel economy standards of the EPCA, the particular
preemption language that applies here is outlined as follows:
[w]hen an average fuel economy standard prescribed under this
chapter is in effect, a State or a political subdivision of a State may
not adopt or enforce a law or regulation related to fuel economy
standards or average fuel economy standards for automobiles
covered by an average fuel economy standard under this chapter.122

As discussed above, this is an express preemption and is
specifically designated as an example of a “relating to” provision.
However, unlike the Clean Air Act provisions, this deals strictly with
laws or regulations relating to fuel economy standards rather than
emissions relating to any chemicals that are emitted from the tail
pipes of vehicles. In turn, GHGs that could potentially be included
under this provision are those that are byproducts of the burning of
fuel specifically such as carbon dioxide.123 However, HFC
regulations or laws would likely be preempted under this statute as
they are related to the indirect emissions results that air
conditioning regulations can have on fuel efficiency and inherent fuel
emissions. Thus, if the waiver stands, direct standard-setting for
emissions of HFCs from vehicle air conditioners will likely be
preempted by the federal government under the provision of the CAA
and EPCA. However, this is not to say there are no alternatives.124
120. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1).
121. 49 U.S.C. § 32919.
122. Id. § 32919(a) (emphasis added).
123. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. & U.S. EPA, FACT SHEET: EPCA PREEMPTION,
https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/documents/fact_sheet__epca_preemption_final_clean_080218_v1-tag.pdf [https://perma.cc/JQ2L-SWQE].
124. See discussion infra Part V.
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Second, if the waiver of California’s emissions exemption is
reversed, it is a much closer question as to whether the state-level
regulation of vehicular HFCs would be preempted by federal law.
Prior to California’s waiver being revoked, both California and
Washington passed legislation regarding the regulation of HFCs in
refrigerants, and neither addressed HFCs within vehicle air
conditioners.125 One potential reason for this may be due to the
requirement of labeling of chemicals within vehicular air
conditioning systems.126 The source of this labeling requirement is
the CAA provisions giving effect to the Montreal Protocol, specifically
Title VI, which was amended and added in 1990, and Sections 611
and 612.127 Section 611 details the labeling requirements for the
unacceptable ozone depleting chemicals, stating that products
containing the said chemicals must contain the following visible
labeling: “Warning: Manufactured with [insert name of substance],
a substance which harms public health and environment by
destroying ozone in the upper atmosphere.”128 Section 612 details
the Safe Alternatives Policy, and provides the EPA Administrator
the authority to “publish a list of (A) the substitutes prohibited under
this subsection for specific uses and (B) the safe alternatives
identified under this subsection for specific uses.”129 EPA has
promulgated various regulations in accordance with the authority
granted under this statute that detail labeling requirements and
conditions of use for the safe alternatives, including HFCs.130 For
example, the regulations still currently in effect regarding car
manufacturers and refrigerant manufacturers labeling of HFCs,
particularly HFC-134a, detail a specific set of standards and
specifications for how these particular chemicals must be labeled,

125. See H.R. 1112, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019); S. 1013, 2018 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 2018).
126.
Unique
Fittings
&
Label
Colors
for
MVAC,
EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/mvac/unique-fittings-label-colors-mvac-refrigerants
[https://perma.cc/7DF9-6LYH] (Oct. 4, 2017).
127. Ozone Protection under Title VI of the Clean Air Act, EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/ozone-layer-protection/ozone-protection-under-title-vi-cleanair-act [https://perma.cc/94AN-CMW4] (Oct. 4, 2017); Labeling Ozone-Depleting
Products,
EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/ods-phaseout/labeling-ozone-depletingproducts [https://perma.cc/G64V-YYQE] (Oct. 14, 2020).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 7671j(d)(1).
129. Id. § 7671k(c).
130. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 82.100–82.124 (2020).
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including a particular color scheme and set of warnings and
disclosures.131
Therefore, if a state were to regulate HFCs within vehicles,
which would inherently require labeling similar to Washington’s
labeling requirements of stationary refrigerant sources,132 a
manufacturer may have to attempt to comply with two sets of
labeling requirements and regulations, one state and one federal,
thereby invoking preemption issues.
As discussed above, there are different types of preemption to
consider. In this narrow hypothetical, it is likely that only implied
conflict preemption would be invoked. There is no explicit federal
provision that would forestall state regulations from regulating
HFCs, specifically in the context of labeling of HFCs. Therefore, this
would not likely bring into question express preemption.
Furthermore, field preemption would not likely be invoked. Field
preemption applies when there is a demonstration that Congress left
no room for states to regulate particular matters.133 Additionally, the
state law must occupy a “field reserved for federal regulation,”134
where the “federal interest is so dominant that the federal system
will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same
subject.”135
In Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., the Third Circuit reversed
the District Court’s holding that field preemption applied to a dispute
between labeling requirements under the Food and Drug Act (FDA)
and state law labeling requirements.136 The Court found that even
though the FDA has a comprehensive and vast regulatory scheme
regarding food and drug laws and labeling requirements, “we are
reluctant to find field preemption predicated solely on the
comprehensiveness of federal regulations,” and the “mere existence
of a federal regulatory scheme . . . does not by itself imply preemption
of state remedies.”137 This is similar to the facts analyzed here. While
the Clean Air Act is an incredibly comprehensive and vast regulatory
scheme, its main purpose is to regulate air emissions from stationary
131. Id. §§ 82.106, 82.108, 82.110, 82.114.
132. H.R. 1112, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019).
133. Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 336 (3d Cir. 2009).
134. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 111 (2000).
135. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990).
136. Holk, 575 F.3d at 339.
137. Id.
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and mobile sources,138 which differs from the Food and Drug Act in
that labeling is a major requirement and purpose of the Food and
Drug Act.139 Here, labeling is simply an offshoot of particular
requirements for a very specified, very minute portion of the Clean
Air Act. In Holk, the Third Circuit still held that field preemption did
not apply, even though labeling requirements are so pervasive and
important throughout the Act.140 Therefore, as labeling
requirements simply do not rise to the same level within the Clean
Air Act, it follows that field preemption would likely not bar the
states from regulating and imposing labeling requirements on the
HFC manufacturers.
However, conflict preemption will likely bar state regulations.
Conflict preemption exists where state law “stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress”141 or “where compliance with both federal and state
regulations is a physical impossibility.”142 Here, the state regulation
would likely make complying with the federal regulation a physical
impossibility. The labeling requirements for HFC-134a are from the
SNAP regulations, which utilizes HFC-134a as an accepted
substitute for ozone-depleting chemicals.143 Thus, the labeling
requirements that the state regulation would impose would
effectively attempt to remove the HFCs from service and warn the
consumer that they are present within the car or that the HFCs have
been removed and are no longer utilized. It would be a physical
impossibility to include this abovementioned type of labeling with
federal requirements that expressly allow HFC-134a to be utilized
and, in fact, pushes it as a substitute for ozone-depleting chemicals.
As such, looking at the regulation of HFCs in mobile sources (namely
light duty vehicles), it is likely that state regulation may still be
preempted by the federal regulations and the Clean Air Act, even if
the California Clean Air Act waiver revocation is reversed in court.

138. Summary of the Clean Air Act, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/lawsregulations/summary-clean-air-act [https://perma.cc/49N2-EEHH] (Aug. 6, 2020).
139. See Holk, 575 F.3d at 331.
140. Id. at 338.
141. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
142. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963).
143. 40 C.F.R. § 82.152 (including hydrofluorocarbons in the list of possible
refrigerant substitutes for class I or II ozone-depleting substance).
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D. State-Level Regulation of HFCs within Vehicle
Refrigerants—Dormant Commerce Clause Issues
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution states
that “Congress shall have Power to . . . regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes.”144 However, as Chief Justice John Marshall explained in
Gibbons v. Ogden, referring to the power that the framers granted to
the federal government in certain provisions of the Constitution
(here, namely the power to “regulate Commerce . . . among the
several states”145), “power can never be exercised by the people
themselves, but must be placed in the hands of agents, or lie
dormant.”146 Effectively, this one line sets the framework for the idea
that the Commerce Clause, while granting power to the federal
government to regulate commerce, also effectively restrains the
states from regulating commerce among states, “even [with] those
parts of the national economy that Congress has not regulated—
where federal power remains dormant.”147 This particular “negative”
aspect of the Commerce Clause has been invoked abundantly
throughout the years and most recently upon the United States
Supreme Court in 2019, with affirmation of the doctrine in Tennessee
Wine & Spirits Retailers Association v. Thomas.148 There, the
Supreme Court affirmed that the Dormant Commerce Clause is still
in effect and reiterated that the pertinent test to sustain a law that
has been determined to discriminate against “out-of-state goods or
nonresident economic actors” is “a showing that [the law] is narrowly
tailored to ‘advance a legitimate local purpose.’”149
A general rule that has arisen from the years of case law is that
the Dormant Commerce Clause prohibits state discrimination
against all “out-of-state economic interests,” and “when a state
statute directly regulates or discriminates against interstate
commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-state economic interests
144. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
145. Id.
146. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 189 (1824).
147. Larry Downes, The Commerce Clause Wakes Up, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept.
2005),
https://hbr.org/2005/09/the-commerce-clause-wakes-up
[https://perma.cc/TD76-GW5G].
148. Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n. v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2461
(2019) (holding that “in light of this history and our established case law, we reiterate
that the Commerce Clause by its own force restricts state protectionism”).
149. Id. (quoting Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338 (2008)).
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over out-of-state interests, [the Courts] have generally struck down
the statute without further inquiry.”150
Additionally, extraterritoriality may be invoked in conjunction
with the Dormant Commerce Clause and will be analyzed as well.
Extraterritoriality is a quasi-prong of the Dormant Commerce
Clause that is invoked when it can be shown that “commerce [] takes
place wholly outside of the regulating state’s borders.”151 Here, the
analysis will surround Washington’s HFC regulation, with the
hypothetical provision included that details the phase-down of HFCs
within vehicular air conditioning units.
First, the hypothetical provision within Washington’s HFC bill
would likely look similar, if not identical, to the provisions regarding
HFCs used in light duty motor vehicle air conditioning units,
contained within the now-overruled SNAP regulations,152 as the rest
of the stationary HFC end-uses within Washington’s bill are adopted
directly from the language of said-regulations.153 As such, whether
the regulations will invoke Dormant Commerce Clause and/or
Extraterritoriality challenges will depend on the retrofitting or
labeling requirements of the refrigerant systems in vehicles as well
as the incentive programs mentioned within Washington’s bill as-is.
Generally, in analyzing a state statute or regulation under the
dormant commerce clause, the Courts have utilized a two-tier
approach. In the first step, a state statute will be deemed invalid per
se if it “discriminates against interstate commerce in favor of in-state
economic interests or if its practical effect is to control conduct
beyond the boundaries of the regulating state.”154 The second step
then applies the “Pike Balancing Test”, which details that, when “a
150. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 487 (2005) (emphasis added). See
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 271–73 (1984); Healy v. Beer Inst., 491
U.S. 324, 337 n.14 (1989).
151. Susan Lorde Martin, The Extraterritoriality Doctrine of Dormant Commerce
Clause is Not Dead, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 497, 503 (2016).
152. Protection of Stratospheric Ozone: Change of Listing Status for Certain
Substitutes Under the Significant New Alternatives Policy Program, 80 Fed. Reg.
42,870, 42,872 (Jul. 20, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 82); Unique Fittings &
Label Colors for MVAC Refrigerants, supra note 126; Substitutes in MVAC:
Passenger Air Conditioning in Light-Duty, Medium-Duty, Heavy-Duty and Off-Road
Vehicles,
EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/snap/substitutes-mvac-passenger-airconditioning-light-duty-medium-duty-heavy-duty-and-road-vehicles
[https://perma.cc/WM7U-SVEG] (June 26, 2019).
153. See H.R. 1112, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019).
154. Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 462, 482 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
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statute has only indirect effects on interstate commerce and
regulates evenhandedly, [the court has] examined whether the
State’s interest is legitimate and whether the burden on interstate
commerce clearly exceeds the local benefits.”155
In the Supreme Court Case of Tennessee Wine & Spirits
Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, the Court held that a two year residency
requirement for alcohol facility licensing was in violation of the
Dormant Commerce Clause because it “expressly discriminates
against nonresidents and has at best a highly attenuated
relationship to public health or safety.”156 However, in Bronco Wine
Co. v. Jolly, the Court held that labeling requirements for a wine
company were not discriminatory to other states after it applied the
Pike balancing test157 and determined that “the state's interests in
protecting the reputation and integrity of its vital wine industry from
the use of misleading brand names outweighs the incidental effect
on interstate and foreign commerce.”158 Similarly, in American
Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, the Court found that a unique marking
design indicating that the canned or bottled beverage is qualified for
recycling in Michigan did not burden interstate commerce because
the “unique-mark requirement burdens in-state beverage
manufacturers who meet the designated thresholds to the same
extent it burdens out-of-state manufacturers who meet the
designated thresholds.”159 However, the Court then went on to hold
that the Dormant Commerce Clause was violated based off of the
extraterritoriality prong since Michigan was “forcing states to
comply with its legislation in order to conduct business within its
state, which creates an impermissible extraterritorial effect.”160
Here, in analyzing Washington’s legislation regarding HFCs, by
incorporating a hypothetical vehicle end-use labeling and retrofitting
requirement, it is likely that the Dormant Commerce Clause will be
violated on the extraterritoriality prong, similar to Snyder. This is
likely the case because applying the labeling and retrofitting
requirement is not discriminatory to other manufacturers outside of
155. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573,
579 (1986) (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
156. Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2474
(2019).
157. Bronco, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 487–92.
158. Id. at 491.
159. Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, 735 F.3d 362, 373 (6th Cir. 2013).
160. Id. at 376.
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Washington when compared to in-state manufacturers. As such, one
must analyze the second prong and apply the Pike balancing test. In
doing so, it is likely that the in-state economic interest to regulate
HFCs and protect the State’s interest of combatting climate change
outweighs the incidental effect on interstate commerce. However,
also similar to Snyder, extraterritoriality would likely be invoked
because mandating auto and refrigerant manufacturers to
completely change their air conditioning unit retrofitting and
implement new and potentially obtrusive labeling requirements to
conform with the phase-down of HFCs would likely equate to
Washington “forcing states to comply with its legislation in order to
conduct business within its state.”161 As such, Washington’s
legislation will likely be in violation of the Dormant Commerce
Clause, specifically in terms of extraterritoriality.
Furthermore, as an aside, since another piece of the analysis
deals with whether the state’s economic interests are favored over
out-of-state interests,162 it is likely that Washington’s legislation,
which implements a state program that incentivizes the elimination
of legacy uses of HFCs,163 would favor in-state interests over out-ofstate interests and thus violate the Dormant Commerce Clause.
V. CONCLUSION AND ALTERNATIVES TO
REGULATING THE PHASE-DOWN OF HFCS
MOVING FORWARD
As determined above, with the current regulations and
environment regarding the phase-down of HFCs, state actors will
likely face various challenges to regulation and legislation of this
issue due to EPA policies promulgated during the Trump
administration.164 However, this is not to say that there are not
alternate routes that may be taken in order to effectuate the
regulation of these detrimental GHGs.
161. Snyder, 735 F.3d at 373.
162. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 472 (2005).
163. H.R. 1112, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019) (requiring a report be
submitted that includes “recommendations for how to fund, structure and prioritize
a state program that incentivizes or provides grants to support the elimination of
legacy uses of [HFCs]”).
164. See Samantha Oller, California Strikes Back at Trump Efforts to Revoke
Emissions
Waiver,
CSP
DAILYNEWS
(Nov.
20,
2019),
https://www.cspdailynews.com/fuels/california-strikes-back-trump-efforts-revokeemissions-waiver [https://perma.cc/7BT4-5VKE].
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Even though EPA has hindered HFC regulations, in April 2020,
the D.C. Circuit court struck down the Trump administration’s
vacatur of the Obama administration’s SNAP regulations. The Court
found the vacatur unlawful because the proper administrative
procedures were not followed.165 In revoking the SNAP regulations,
EPA did not provide the public an opportunity to weigh in on its
decision, and thus, the D.C. Circuit Court held that “the one option
EPA could not permissibly pursue was the one it chose: promulgating
a legislative rule without abiding by notice-and-comment
requirements and without invoking any exception to those
obligations.”166 Thus, even though the EPA will likely appeal this
ruling, there is hope at the federal administrative and judicial level
to effectively regulate these detrimental chemicals once again.
Additionally, federal legislation can still prove to be a powerful
tool in addressing this issue. While local actors are working to
regulate HFCs at the state-level, the federal legislature has also been
working to get a bill, identified as the American Innovation and
Manufacturing Act (AIM Act) of 2019, which originated in the
Senate, to a vote.167 This particular piece of legislation is built
around the innovation of new alternative refrigerants to replace
HFCs and other GHGs utilized currently in refrigerant end-uses.168
On March 11, 2020, John Barrasso (R-Wyoming), the committee
chair of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee,
decided that the bill would go to legislative hearing in front of the
Senate on March 25, 2020 in order to “improve the legislation so it
works for all American people.”169 This particular bill allegedly has
bipartisan support in the senate,170 though as of the time of this
Note, a vote has not been called. Additionally, at the time of this
Note, due to COVID-19 concerns, the March 25, 2020 legislative
hearing was replaced with a Public Comment period in which
165. See Rachel Frazin, Court Strikes Down EPA Suspension of Obama-era
Greenhouse Gas Rule, THE HILL (Apr. 7, 2020), https://thehill.com/policy/energyenvironment/491568-court-strikes-down-epa-suspension-of-obama-era-hfc-rule
[https://perma.cc/44LB-KMRA].
166. Id.
167. S. 2754, 116th Cong. (2019).
168. Id. § 6.
169. Rachel Frazin, Senate Environment Committee to Hear HFC Proposal
Stalling
Energy
Bill
Passage,
THE
HILL
(Mar.
11,
2020),
https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/487146-senate-environmentcommittee-to-hear-hfc-proposal-stalling-energy [https://perma.cc/2PYW-L769].
170. See id.

33

456

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

interested parties are able to send concerns and suggestions
regarding the bill to the Senate Committee, which will then take the
comments into consideration and post them on the Senate
Committee website.171 As of April 29, 2020, approximately 118
representatives of various senate, industry, environmental, and
state associations and entities have provided written comment and
testimony regarding the AIM Act, with certain important industry,
environmental, and state leaders supporting the passing of this
bipartisan bill.172
Additionally, as the presidency has changed hands, and the
Biden administration has entered the White House, multiple
positive updates have occurred regarding the regulation of HFCs at
the federal level. Primarily, the abovementioned bipartisan AIM Act
was included in an omnibus to the Consolidated Appropriations Act
of 2021, identified as the American Innovation and Manufacturing
Act of 2021.173 This is incredibly exciting, and forecasts a positive
step in the right direction for the phase down of HFCs at the federal
level-though vehicular HFC regulation is still not expressly included
within this bill.
Furthermore, on January 27, 2021, President Biden signed an
Executive Order titled, “Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and
Abroad,” which explicitly directs the Secretary of State to prepare a
“transmittal package” seeking the Senate’s consent to ratify the
Kigali Amendment.174 This is another beacon of hope for the
171. Robert Beverly, Senate Scraps AIM Act Hearing, Adds Public Comment
Process, ACHR NEWS (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.achrnews.com/articles/142915senate-scraps-aim-act-hearing-adds-public-comment-process
[https://perma.cc/5VD4-6S58].
172. S. 2754, American Innovation and Manufacturing Act of 2019: Written
Testimony and Questions for the Record, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON ENV’T. & PUB. WORKS
(Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2020/3/s-2754american-innovation-and-manufacturing-act-of-2019-written-testimony-andquestions-for-the-record [https://perma.cc/5NHF-TWZX]. Examples of industry
leaders in refrigeration supporting the bill include Arkema, Inc., ASHRAE, AirConditioning, Heating, and Refrigeration Institute (AHRI), National Automobile
Dealers Association of America (NADA). Id. A few environmental leaders supporting
the bill include Natural Resource Defense Council (NRDC), Earthjustice, Nature
Conservancy, Sierra Club. Id. States and local leaders that support the bill include
California Air Resources Board, U.S. Climate Alliance, New Yorkers for Cool
Refrigerant Management, Attorneys General of the States of New York, California,
Delaware, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Oregon, New Jersey, Vermont,
Washington, and the District of Columbia. Id.
173. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-260 (2020).
174. Exec. Order No. 14,008, 86 Fed Reg. 7,619 (Feb. 1, 2021).
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resurgence of the United States’ international presence in the
climate arena.
Further, even though preemption or dormant commerce clause
issues may arise, there is nothing stopping state actors from working
with industry to determine whether feasible alternatives are
available in phasing down HFCs on a state-by-state basis without
invoking lawsuits. In certain states, the automotive industry has
entered into agreements with state regulators in order to continue
California’s more stringent emissions criteria, even in light of EPA
revoking the waiver.175
If industry and state actors are willing to come to agreement on
certain facets within the regulatory scene, HFCs may have the
potential to be phased-down, even if there is pushback from the
federal government. For example, companies have been working on
implementing different types of air conditioning units within
vehicles that are more fuel efficient and utilize HFC-152a, a chemical
that has an exponentially lower GWP than the leading type, HFC134a.176 As mentioned above, while it would be ideal for all HFCs to
be phased-out, if there is a possibility for a dialogue to continue
between environmentalists, local and state actors, and the
refrigerant/auto industry, there is a real possibility for change to
occur and extremely high GWP-potential HFC refrigerants to no
longer be the norm.
In tackling an overwhelmingly important and relevant issue as
climate change, there are necessarily countless hurdles that must be
addressed. Currently in the United States, the regulation and phasedown of exceptionally high GWP chemicals is one such hurdle that
has required, and will continue to require, significant time,
resources, and negotiations between government actors,
environmental groups, and industry. In detailing the United States’
role in climate change and GHG emission regulations, this Note has
analyzed the state’s power in regulating HFCs in refrigerant enduses, specifically focusing on mobile air conditioning units. In
summary, in light of the EPA’s revocation of California’s Clean Air
175. Oller, supra note 164.
176. Green Automobile Air Conditioner Technology Demonstration Project,
&
CLEAN
AIR
COAL.
(Mar.
25,
2019),
CLIMATE
https://www.ccacoalition.org/en/news/green-automobile-air-conditioner-technologydemonstration-project [https://perma.cc/57S8-6SSE].
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Act tailpipe emissions waiver, it is likely that the states’ power to
regulate HFCs is preempted, and also likely limited or barred by the
Dormant Commerce Clause. However, this Note focuses on the
extremely narrow window of state-level regulation of HFCs and the
even narrower lens of vehicular end-uses. In the larger climate
change scheme, there are legitimate routes available in which the
United States, through action taken as a nation and through zealous
local and state action, can regain its environmental footing and
successfully combat climate change through the phase-down of
HFCs.
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